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Legal academics and the public are fascinated by both constitutional 
text and the processes by which it is interpreted.  The precise role for 
legal academics in the interpretation of such charters is controverted.  
Doctrine and case law as established by the courts remain the core of 
academic legal discourse.  Case law is, after all, the object about which 
doctrine is based, built, and extended.  But the interpretation of 
constitutional text through case law comes with costs—it seems to lack 
democratic legitimacy, and where unconnected to text and history, it has 
a tendency to fence out (even the well-educated) public.1  On the other 
hand, when legal academics shift to text and history, their work gains 
populist credentials, but, at that point, the legal academic risks his 
privileged position.  For the legal academic has no monopoly, or even 
highly developed expertise, with regard to textual exegesis or the best 
use of historical materials.2  In light of those attendant risks, I want to 
praise Professor Geoffrey R. Stone for taking on the role of exegete and 
historian.  But that said, I find some of his specific textual and historical 
claims troubling.  I respond to his textual and historical claims in detail 
below.  This Article, however, has no grand normative claim of its own; 
it has no grand methodological vision; rather, it is merely an effort on my 
 
What Oaths Meant to the Framers' Generation:  A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 273, available at http://tinyurl.com/yk6974l, and Bruce G. Peabody, 
Response, Analogize This: Constitutional Interpretation, Religion, and Maintaining the 
Political Order, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO (forthcoming). 
 
 1. For a wonderful example of this genre (and its inherent limits), see Christopher 
C. Lund, Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions:  A Response to Eisgruber and 
Sager, 77 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263514 (last visited July 18, 2009).  In an extensive discussion 
of First Amendment case law, doctrine, and legal scholarship, the Constitution’s text is 
nowhere quoted.  It is not even cited.  This is not a criticism of Professor Lund’s paper.  I 
am just noting that such scholarship takes on the flavor of inside baseball. 
 2. See, e.g., infra notes 26, 31-41 and accompanying text (discussing Professor 
Stone’s historical claims in detail); cf., e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification 
of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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part to correct the record, and thereby to further the object pursued first 
by Professor Stone:  “to know the truth about the Framers, about what 
they believed, and about what they aspired to when they created this 
nation.”3 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR STONE’S TEXTUAL CLAIMS 
In The World of the Framers:  A Christian Nation?, a recent article 
appearing in another law review, Professor Stone wrote: 
Indeed, it is quite striking, and certainly no accident, that unlike the 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the U.S. Constitution made no 
reference whatsoever to God and cited as its primary source of 
authority not “the word of God,” but “We the People.”  The stated 
purpose of the Constitution was not to create a “Government 
established according to God,” nor to establish a “Christian nation,” 
but rather to create a secular state.  The only reference to religion in 
the original Constitution prohibited the use of any religious test for 
holding office, and the First Amendment made clear that there 
“would be no Church of the United States.”4 
Is that correct?  Is it true that the text makes “no reference whatsoever to 
God”?  Is it true that the “only reference to religion” in the original 
unamended text was the Religious Test Clause?  To me at least, these 
seem to be an unusually strong set of (textual) claims for a law review 
article:  claims lacking recognition of ambiguity and contrary points of 
view. 
The Attestation Clause.  Every copy of the Constitution I have seen 
since childhood ends with: 
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present 
the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one 
 
 3. Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers:  A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 1 (2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/bqk8tq. 
 4. Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted); see also James E. Pfander, So Help Me 
God:  Religion and Presidential Oath-Taking, 16 CONST. COMM. 549, 550 (1999) 
(“Unlike the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation, both of 
which invoked God’s blessing, the Constitution contains no reference to God.”); Brooke 
Allen, Our Godless Constitution, THE NATION, Feb. 3, 2005, at 14, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/6lrl28 (“Our Constitution makes no mention whatever of God.”); Nat 
Hentoff, God Is Not in the Constitution, THE VILLAGE VOICE, July 2, 2002, at 31, 
available at http://tinyurl.com/q8v9h9 (“An even longer American tradition is that there 
is no mention of God in the Constitution.”).  How is it “striking” that the Constitution 
of 1787 stylistically veered from the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut—an 
instrument 150 years older than the Constitution at the time of ratification?  Is not the 
relevant benchmark how the Constitution veered from contemporaneous instruments of a 
similar character?  See infra note 5. 
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thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of 
the United States of America the Twelfth . . . .5 
Is not that a direct textual reference to God, even if not your God or 
mine, or even if you do not believe in any God at all?  I am certainly not 
suggesting that the presence of this clause makes ours a Christian nation, 
nor am I suggesting that even any one Framer or Ratifier thought that 
this clause had a justiciable meaning that could control a live case or 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2 (Attestation Clause).  See generally Posting of Seth 
Barrett Tillman to Humanities and Social Sciences Net Online, Constitution’s References 
to God, http://tinyurl.com/7h63no (Nov. 3, 2003, 16:00:48 PST) (noting potential 
significance of dual dating in Article VII); EDWIN MEESE ET AL., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO 
THE CONSTITUTION 301-02 (2005) (same).  But see Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic 
Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 125 n.19 (2008) (stating that “[t]he reference to ‘the 
Year of our Lord’ simply employed the conventional dating method of the era”) 
(emphasis added).  What is important to note here is that Professor Smith’s view is 
neither an interpretation of a legal instrument nor a (pure) legal intuition; rather, it is his 
understanding of an eighteenth century cultural convention or folkway.  Because his 
opinion here is one unrelated to legal expertise, it is entitled to no special deference.  In 
other words, although Professor Smith’s position is common wisdom, early American 
legal materials, in fact, used a variety of dating conventions.  Simply put, there was no 
single “conventional dating method.”  See, e.g., Articles of Association of 1774 (dated 
“In Congress, Philadelphia, October 20, 1774”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
(dated “July 4, 1776”); DEL. CONST. of 1776 (dated “Friday, September 10, 1776”); N.H. 
CONST. of 1776 (dated “January 5, 1776”); N.J. CONST. of 1776 (dated “July 2, 1776”); 
N.C. CONST. of 1776 (dated “December the eighteenth, one thousand seven hundred and 
seventy-six”); PA. CONST. of 1776 (dated “Passed in Convention the 28th day of 
September, 1776”); S.C. CONST. of 1776 (dated “March 26, 1776”); VA. CONST. of 1776 
(not internally dated); N.Y. CONST. of 1777 (dated “20th April, 1777”); MASS. CONST. 
of 1780 (not internally dated).  This is not to say that the dating convention used in the 
Constitution of 1787 was new.  It was not.  See Articles of Confederation of 1777 (using 
the same dating convention later used in the Constitution of 1787); GA. CONST. of 1777 
(dated “in convention, the fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
seven hundred and seventy-seven, and in the first year of the Independence of the United 
States of America”); cf. MD. CONST. of 1776 (dated “14th day of August, anno 
domini 1776”).  Of course, neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations had revolutionary era state constitutions.  (The quoted material is available on 
The Avalon Project–Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy:  18th Century 
Documents:  1700-1799, http://tinyurl.com/bej4nt (last visited July 18, 2009), on The 
Constitution Society, http://www.constitution.org (last visited July 18, 2009), and on 
Constitutions of the World Online/The Rise of Modern Constitutionalism 1776-1849, 
http://tinyurl.com/c3aecy (last visited July 18, 2009).) 
Interestingly, in contrast to the dating convention used in the Attestation Clause, 
Article V simply refers to “the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. V; see Henry V. Jaffa, Graglia’s Quarrel with God:  Atheism and Nihilism 
Masquerading as Constitutional Argument, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 729 (1996).  
Professor Jaffa also suggests, contra Stone, that the Preamble’s use of “blessing” was a 
reference to God.  Compare id. at 718 (“What did the American people mean by a 
[‘]blessing[’] [as used in the Constitution’s Preamble], except something good in the eyes 
of God, something in the gift of God, something that one prayed that God might think 
you deserved?”), with Pfander, supra note 4, at 550 (“Unlike the Declaration of 
Independence and the Articles of Confederation, both of which invoked God’s blessing, 
the Constitution contains no reference to God.”). 
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controversy.  But in making his argument that the United States 
Constitution created a “secular” nation, that the text makes “no reference 
whatsoever to God,” Professor Stone has simply ignored the actual text 
of the Constitution he seeks to explain. 
The Oaths and Affirmations Clause.  Nor is this the only such clause 
in the Constitution that makes some (albeit indirect) reference to God.  
The Article VI Oaths and Affirmations Clause mandated that all future 
federal and state legislators and certain6 officers take an oath or 
affirmation to support the Constitution.7  What is the difference between 
 
 6. See Steven G. Calabresi, Response, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 162 (1995) (“No constitutional oath is required of 
[non-member subordinate] legislative officers, like the Clerk of the House or the 
Secretary of the Senate, presumably [!] because those officers were not thought to be 
very important.”).  Compare AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A 
BIOGRAPHY 301 (2006) (“The final paragraph of Article VI obliged a host of state and 
federal policymakers to take personal oaths of allegiance ‘to support this Constitution.’”) 
(emphasis added), with id. (“Article VI forbade any ‘religious Test’ for any federal office 
or post . . . .”) (emphasis added).  But see Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 353 
(Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“The oath to support the constitution is not peculiar to 
the judges, but is taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government, and is 
designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind the officer in 
the discharge of his duty . . . .”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,  The Constitution of 
Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1261 (2004) (describing the Article VI oath as 
“universal” and applying to “all federal and state officers”); William H. Pryor, Jr., The 
Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 347, 350 (2006) (“The Framers required in Article VI of the Constitution that all the 
officers of our government, including judges, ‘be bound by oath or affirmation, to support 
th[e] Constitution.’”); Paul Horwitz, Colloquy Essay, Honor’s Constitutional Moment:  
The Oath and Presidential Transitions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2009); 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 259, 261 (2008) (“Under Article VI of the Constitution, every 
federal and state officer takes an oath or affirmation to ‘support this Constitution.’”) 
(citing Article VI, Clause 3) (emphasis in the original); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the 
Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 920 
(2009) (“It is ‘this Constitution’—a specific written text—that all officers of government 
swear to support and to be bound by, according to its written terms.”) (emphasis added).  
The problem with all of the commentators above (including Professors Amar and 
Calabresi) is that they either fail to see or fail to put the reader on notice that there is a 
very real unresolved issue here:  the Founders excluded from the operation of the 
Article VI oath certain officers:  the Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, and, 
arguably, the Vice President, and President (subject to a free-standing Article II oath).  
See Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce:  The 
Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the 
Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 135-40, 146-53 (2008), 
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf.  The question is 
why those officers were excluded:  a subject I hope to return to in a later publication.  
What is important to note is that one can only answer this question if one knows there is a 
question here to answer. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“Oath or Affirmation”); see also id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 6 (mandating that Senators adjudicate impeachments “on Oath or Affirmation”); cf. id. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (mandating that the President “swear (or affirm)” to his “Oath or 
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an oath and affirmation?  The consensus view—and as far as I know the 
universal view—is that the former is taken in God’s name, but the latter 
is not.8  The purpose of the clause—according to the standard narrative—
was to permit Quakers and others having “a religious or other 
conscientious objections to oath-taking”9 to also hold public office.  The 
purpose is one of “inclusiveness and tolerance,”10 but it is also a textual 
reference to God in our public charter—albeit an indirect one. 
The Sundays Excepted Clause.  Another clause that might interest 
us is the Sundays Excepted Clause, which provides:  “If any Bill shall 
not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after 
it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law . . . .”11  
Does this clause establish any specific or named religion?  No.  Does it 
establish a particular church?  No.  But if the intent of the Founders or 
Ratifiers had been “to create” no more and no less than “a secular 
state,”12 then ought not Professor Stone tell us why this clause was 
 
Affirmation”).  Notice how the priority was on swearing (viz., oath-taking), not 
affirming. 
It is not surprising that the Bill of Rights—enacted some two years after the 
Constitution came into force—generally followed suit stylistically with the original 
Constitution.  Compare id. amend. IV (1791) (mandating that warrants shall only issue if 
supported by an “Oath or affirmation”), with id. amend. XIV, § 3 (1868) (imposing a 
disability on those who engaged in insurrection or rebellion if they had previously taken 
an “oath” to the support the Constitution—notably turning to a lower case “o” and also 
omitting any reference to affirmations). 
 8. See, e.g., 67 C.J.S. Oaths and Affirmations:  Definitions and General 
Considerations § 2 (1978) (defining “oath” as “an appeal by a person to God to witness 
the truth of what he declares”); Dictionary.com (defining an “oath” as “a solemn appeal 
to a deity”).  See generally 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 202 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, no 
publisher 1836) (quoting Oliver Wolcott, at the Connecticut ratifying convention, who 
stated that the Oaths and Affirmations Clause mandates “a direct appeal to that God who 
is the avenger of perjury.  Such an appeal to him is a full acknowledgment of his being 
and providence.”), available at http://tinyurl.com/dzojht.  For a fuller development of the 
legal issues and history surrounding oaths and affirmations, which I only touch on in the 
main text of this Article, see generally STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY 
SWEAR:  THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009); MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I 
DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR:  THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL OATH:  ITS MEANING AND 
IMPORTANCE IN THE HISTORY OF OATHS (1999); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential 
Oath, The American National Interest and a Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
 9. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 301. 
 10. Id. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 12. Stone, supra note 3, at 5.  But see Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 507 (2008) (arguing, contrary to Supreme Court authority, that the Sundays 
Excepted Clause’s purpose was to accommodate principles of deliberation and federalism 
by accommodating extant state blue laws, as opposed to accommodating the religious 
sentiments of federal office-holders). 
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included in the Constitution, and thereby entrenched against mundane 
democratic action?  One wonders what purpose or purposes Professor 
Stone believes this clause was meant to serve. 
The Religious Test Clause.  Additionally, I note that Professor Stone 
wrote that the Religious Test Clause prohibits “the use of any religious 
test for holding office.”13  I do not mean to quibble, but his position is not 
quite right—or, at the very least, his position is not the only possible 
understanding of the clause.  Its meaning may have been more limited 
than Professor Stone suggests. 
The Religious Test Clause prohibits the use of any religious test as a 
“Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”14  
In other words, textually, the clause precludes any religious test used to 
qualify a person for office—i.e., a test implemented at the time a person 
is elected or appointed to office, or at the start of the term for which the 
officer was elected or appointed, or at the time the officer accepts office 
or takes office by displacing15 or removing his outgoing predecessor, or 
 
I should also point out that at I am not the first person to note the religious 
antecedents of the Attestation Clause, the Oaths and Affirmations Clause (and the related 
oaths clauses), and the Sundays Excepted Clause.  See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of 
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting “the 
federal government’s symbology has been Christian—down to the dating of the 
Constitution”).  For a very full development of these issues, which I only touch on in the 
main text of this Article, see generally Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian 
Commonwealth:  An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on 
References to God and the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 
BAYLOR L. REV. 927 (1996); Richard Albert, Religion in the New Republic, 67 LA. L. 
REV. 1 (2006); Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak 
Foundation for Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, 2009 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 196, 198 & nn.6-7. 
 13. Stone, supra note 3, at 5. 
 14. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (prohibiting religious tests as a requirement 
to “Qual[ify] to any Office or public Trust under the United States”), with id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 7 (mandating that conviction on impeachment “shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States”) (emphasis added).  It is not clear to me if “enjoy” refers 
to qualifications applying while an officer holds office or to qualifications applying to an 
officer who exercises the powers or duties of an office he does not hold (i.e., an acting 
officer).  Either way, the Disqualifications Clause is distinguishable from the Religious 
Test Clause, the clause which interests us here. 
 15. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole 
ed., 2005) (“The consent of that body [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well 
as to appoint [officers of the United States subject to presidential nomination].”) 
(emphasis added), with Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (forthcoming 2010) (opining on Hamilton’s use of 
“displace,” rather than “remove”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331664.  See 
generally Jeremy D. Bailey, The Traditional View of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77 and an 
Unexpected Challenge:  A Response to Seth Barrett Tillman, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
169 (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473276.  
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at the time the officer takes his oath (or affirmation) of office, or, finally, 
at the time the officer first attempts to execute the powers of office.  
“The question with reference to the point of time at which [a] required 
qualification for office [must] exist is a complex judicial question.”16  If, 
as I suggest, qualifications only apply at some discrete moment or point 
of time, then, contra Professor Stone, once qualified, once in office, once 
a person begins to hold office and thereafter, the Religious Test Clause 
has no further application (as a textual matter).  Now, post-1791, such 
religious tests going to office-holders and office-holding, are precluded 
under the aegis of the more general First Amendment.  But in 1789, in 
the (non-wholly Christian, non-wholly secular) world of the Framers and 
Ratifiers, under the Constitution unamended by the Bill of Rights, it very 
well may have been a different story. 
Does my textual critique vanquish Stone’s central point—that the 
American Constitution’s “stated purpose [was] to create a secular 
state”?17  No, not entirely—and it is not really my purpose to do so.  In 
fact, it is certainly true that the Founders’ design lacked a national 
establishment.  Nevertheless, our national government continued to 
coexist (comfortably) for many years with its component states, many of 
which had established churches in 1787 and continued to have them for 
 
 16. 67 C.J.S. Officers:  When Eligibility Must Be Present § 18 (1978) (emphasis 
added); cf. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 55 (2008) (distinguishing 
qualifications making use of “holding office” language as opposed to “eligibility to” 
office language); Posting of Steven G. Calabresi to Balkinization, Steven G. Calabresi on 
the Oath Controversy, http://tinyurl.com/dbkgo4 (Jan. 25, 2009, 6:38 PM) (“The Oath 
Clause simply mandates that the President must take the oath before entering on the 
execution of his office.”).  Compare Bowerbank v. Morris, 3 F. Cas. 1062, 1064 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1801) (No. 1726) (Tilghman, C.J.) (“A removal from office may be either express, 
that is, by a notification by order of the president of the United States that an officer is 
removed; or implied, by the appointment of another person to the same office.  But in 
either case, the removal is not completely effected till notice actually [is] received by the 
person removed.”), with id. at 1065-66 (Griffith, J.) (“The new commission must be 
accepted and shown to the old marshal, or other notice of it given to him, before he can 
be said to be removed from his office by the will or pleasure of the president.  There is 
then a new patentee, and a proper discharge of the old marshal.  I do not go the length of 
saying the new marshal must be sworn in . . . but he must accept and give notice by 
showing his commission or otherwise, to his predecessor; and from that time he must be 
considered as the officer, though before he ‘enters on the duties of his office,’ he must be 
sworn in.”). 
Furthermore, I point out that where the Founders wanted language going to a holder 
of office or during the whole length of an officer’s term of service, they readily made use 
of such language.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative 
shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under 
the Authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the Emoluments 
whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office 
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.”) (emphasis added); cf. supra note 14. 
 17. Stone, supra note 3, at 5. 
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many decades to come.  Indeed, many scholars have argued that the very 
purpose of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was to 
prevent disestablishment of state churches by the newly constituted 
federal authorities,18 which, if true, is a storyline which is somewhat 
inconsistent with Stone’s the Founders-intended-a-secular-state 
narrative.  Those less pluralistic days ended prior to Reconstruction and a 
return to such times is now foreclosed by the Reconstruction 
Amendments.19  So if what we mean by a Christian state—a government 
comparable to then-contemporaneous England and Scotland, which each 
had their own established churches, then the government of the early 
Republic was not a Christian state.20  But if what we mean by a secular 
state is a government comparable to that created by the French 
Revolution—a government that dated its instruments exclusively in 
terms of the revolutionary calendar and which made no accommodations 
to its religious elements, then our government did not take that shape 
either.  To me at least it seems less than fully forthcoming to describe the 
 
 18. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998). 
 19. The standard view is that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
protections of the First Amendment against the States, which would foreclose the 
possibility of a state-established religion, quite apart from any national establishment.  
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Roberts, J.) (“The First 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”); 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (Black, J.) (same). 
 20. I suppose one could argue that after the Act of Union in 1707, the newly formed 
government of Great Britain lacked—as a purely legal matter—a unified or nationally 
established church.  Rather, its primary component “states”—England with Wales, and 
Scotland—had their own individual religious establishments, i.e., the Church of England, 
the Church of Scotland.  In this sense, 1787 America was following a British 
tradition:  the component American political entities had religious establishments (or, at 
least, they were legally free to have them), but not the national government.  I am not 
saying the early Americans were aping the British system, which mandated coexisting 
legally recognized local religious establishments within a larger national entity.  But it 
may be that the same sort of historical forces resulted in not dissimilar political 
resolutions and accommodations.  Cf. Geoffrey Stone, University of Chicago 
Podcast:  The World of the Framers:  A Christian Nation?, The University of Chicago 
Law School:  The Faculty Podcast, http://tinyurl.com/afbnn6, at 00:48:00 (July 11, 2008) 
(noting that circa 1787-1789, eleven of thirteen states had established churches) (last 
visited July 27, 2009). 
To be sure, my analysis above may be controverted, particularly as a practical, as 
opposed to a purely legal matter.  Eighteenth century British subjects (and even Whitehall 
law officers) may have taken the view that a pareve free-floating otherwise non-sectarian 
common Protestantism was established nationally, but the law permitted variants 
depending on local traditions.  It goes without saying that 1787 America was not 
analogous.  The point is that there were any of a number of ways to fairly characterize the 
British establishment circa the Act of Union.  The same may be said for the United States 
circa 1787.  Characterizing the national government instituted by the Constitution 
of 1787 as “secular” is such a view, but it is only one such view. 
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government of the early Republic as Christian or secular.  It was just 
more complex than that.  History usually works that way.  Indeed, my 
own experience is that text, structure, and history rarely all line up the 
same way, and if they do, it usually means that we have simply missed 
something of consequence or (even worse) have drunk the hemlock of 
our own ideas so deeply that we fail to see the value in other people21 and 
in other peoples’ points of view. 
Which takes me to my second point. 
Nowhere in Professor Stone’s article is there any discussion of the 
arguments or any acknowledgment, by name, of the persons he is 
opposing.  He asserts that someone somewhere has made the argument 
that America is a “Christian nation.”22  He cites, but does not quote, a 
single article in The New York Times23 (ostensibly, not by one of his 
 
 21. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 6 (“Indeed, as we shall see, many of the leaders 
of the Revolutionary generation were not Christians in any traditional sense.  They were 
[by contrast?] broad-minded intellectuals . . . .”) (bracketed language added by Tillman).  
Such claims as these are not capable of falsification or validation in any meaningful 
sense.  It strikes me that this is an unnecessarily contentious pseudo-religious-type claim.  
My guess is that it was inadvertent, which, all things considered, only makes it worse.  
Burke, as usual, put it best: 
That those persons should tolerate all opinions, who think none to be of 
estimation, is a matter of small merit.  Equal neglect is not impartial kindness.  
The species of benevolence, which arises from contempt, is no true charity.  
There are in England abundance of men who tolerate in the true spirit of 
toleration.  They think the dogmas of religion, though in different degrees, are 
all of moment; and that amongst them there is, as amongst all things of value, a 
just ground of preference.  They favour, therefore, and they tolerate.  They 
tolerate, not because they despise opinions, but because they respect justice. 
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 223 (London, J. 
Dodsley 10th ed. 1791), available at http://tinyurl.com/cctrfp. 
 22. Stone, supra note 3, at 3. 
 23. See id. at 2 n.7 (citing Neela Banerjee, Clashing Over Church Ritual and Flag 
Protocol at the Naval Academy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A9, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/2erfja).  I quote Professor Stone in full: 
Let me begin with a recent story from the New York Times, which reported that 
each Sunday, at the Naval Academy Chapel in Annapolis, at a few minutes past 
eleven a.m., the choir stops singing and a color guard carrying the American 
flag strides up the aisle.  Below a cobalt blue stained-glass window of Jesus, a 
midshipman dips the American flag before the altar cross.  Evangelical 
Christians in the Navy defend this practice on the ground that it represents the 
highest traditions of our nation.  One Air Force Academy graduate, however, 
objected to this practice, stating that the oath he and others had “taken is to 
protect and defend the Constitution, not the New Testament.”  Is there a 
difference? 
Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  But see Geoffrey Stone, University of 
Chicago Podcast:  The World of the Framers:  A Christian Nation?, The University of 
Chicago Law School:  The Faculty Podcast, http://tinyurl.com/afbnn6, at 00:02:45 
(July 11, 2008) (stating that the objector was a navy graduate) (last visited July 27, 2009).  
Unfortunately, Stone never tells us what this or any objector’s objection is rooted in.  
(And if there is nothing objectionable here, why does he tell this story?)  Is his concern 
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intellectual opponents, but merely by a reporter reporting on events) and 
two books,24 the more recent of which dates from 1987—over twenty 
years ago.  In no place does he discuss precisely who25 is making the 
 
tied to forced participation or coercion?  Is it government entanglement, including, for 
example, the expenditure of government funds or the use of government property?  Is it 
government endorsement, or favoritism among sects, or between religion and irreligion?  
Indeed, it is difficult to square any of these constitutional concerns with the actual article 
cited by Stone.  In the Times’ article, supra, the thrust of the objection to the Naval 
chapel’s flag dipping practice is its inconsistency with flag practices elsewhere in the 
fleet and its inconsistency with the directory provisions of the United States Flag Code.  
See 4 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
It is important to note that to the extent concern here is tied to any forced 
participation or coercion, or to any favoritism among sects, or between religion and 
irreligion, or to the expenditure of public funds, or to the use of government 
property:  such concerns would go the very existence of the Naval Academy’s chapel and 
its choir.  Professor Stone and apparently the Times’ article’s author’s objection, by 
contrast, is tied to the practice of flag-dipping:  pure symbolic speech.  See Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (holding that expressive content associated 
with flag burning is protected by the First Amendment); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971) (Harlan, J.).  Surely it is not frivolous to suggest that the principles 
announced in Texas v. Johnson and Cohen v. California might be applicable in a military 
academy’s chapel? 
It goes without saying that if the objector’s objection were rooted in coercion, as in 
mandated participation, then that would be a very serious charge, which if proven would 
deserve a remedy.  But in that situation the substantive content of the Naval Chapel’s 
ritual, i.e., flag-dipping or its absence, and other such purely symbolic speech, would be 
wholly irrelevant.  The coercion theme is touched upon in the Times’ article, but where 
the Times article does discuss allegations rooted in coercion, the allegations do not relate 
to the contested flag-dipping ritual or even to the Navy, but apparently relate to incidents 
involving the Air Force and the Army.  Finally, concerns tied to government endorsement 
of religion are not touched upon in the Times’ article at all. 
 24. See Stone, supra note 3, at 3 n.13 (citing JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN AMERICA! 25 
(1980), and TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS 29 (1987)).  LaHaye’s 
publication is more than twenty years old.  One wonders if LaHaye or Professor Stone 
remains wed to everything they wrote more than twenty years ago.  Of course, we cannot 
ask this of Falwell; he is dead. 
Additionally, Stone relies on Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore’s The Godless 
Constitution:  The Case Against Religious Correctness, a book-length 1996 publication.  
See Stone, supra note 3, at 3 n.13.  The Godless Constitution has no footnotes supporting 
its claims, and it does not provide a complete bibliography of the materials on which it 
relies.  Moreover, the quotations from Robertson, Dobson, Reed, and any number of 
unnamed evangelicals are undated.  I would not establish a hard and fast rule that reliance 
by legal scholars on such an introductory book intended for generalists is always wrong, 
particularly when alternative sources are not available.  But if there really is a genuine 
ongoing dispute, within academia or in wider American society, as to whether or not the 
United States was founded as a “Christian nation,” then why is reliance on such a text the 
best Stone can manage?  See infra note 26 (quoting Kramnick & Moore). 
 25. Although unwilling to name his opponents and to explain their ideas, he is quite 
willing to name names in regard to academics with whom he agrees.  See Stone, supra 
note 3, at 3 (“As the Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn . . . .”).  Why gratuitously mention 
Harvard?  Would Bailyn’s view be of less value if he taught at the University of Southern 
North Central State [sic] at Hoople?  Cf. id. at 5 (“From the Declaration of Independence 
through the adoption of the Bill of Rights, no one of any consequence ever referred to the 
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arguments he has opposed, when and in what forums they have made 
those arguments, and what arguments or evidence (if any) they have 
marshaled on behalf of their position.  Nor does Stone discuss how their 
positions might differ among one another—including different 
conceptions of what it might mean to describe the United States as a 
secular or Christian nation.  This aspect of Professor Stone’s 
presentation—one lacking acknowledgment (much less substantial 
development) of opposing viewpoints—is troubling.26 
Let me put it another way:  when one of Professor Stone’s purported 
intellectual opponents asserts that the United States was founded as a 
“Christian nation,” what does that person mean?  Is that a claim about 
what an American circa 1787 expected about post-1787 demographic 
development?  Is it a claim about the intellectual culture circa 1787?  Or, 
is it an interpretive claim about the original understanding of our 
founding legal and political documents (and if so, which documents)?  
Stone never tells us what his opponents mean, only that they are wrong. 
Obviously, Stone is opposing someone, somewhere, but because he 
never tells us precisely who they are, and what precise intellectual claims 
they are making, his essay comes across as a battle against “ghosts and 
apparitions.”27  His article is just another tombstone in America’s long, 
useless culture war. 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR STONE’S CLAIMS RELATING TO 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE AND 
UNIVERSITY CULTURE 
I quote Professor Stone in full. 
The Christian establishment responded with a vengeance [to the 
spread of Deism].  As early as 1759, Ezra Stiles warned that “Deism 
has got such a Head” that it is necessary to “conquer and demolish 
it.”  Thirty years later, Timothy Dwight, the president of Yale, 
published a biting antideist work, The Triumph of Infidelity, and 
 
United States as ‘a Christian nation.’”) (emphasis added).  How precisely does one 
determine what people are “of any consequence”?  Cf. infra note 30. 
 26. Cf., e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS 
CONSTITUTION:  THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 23 (1996) (“conced[ing] the 
existence of a strong countertradition that also dates back to the founders and that has 
many able defenders”). 
 27. BURKE, supra note 21, at 210: 
You are terrifying yourself with ghosts and apparitions, whilst your house is the 
haunt of robbers.  It is thus with all those, who, attending only to the shell and 
husk of history, think they are waging war with intolerance, pride, cruelty, 
whilst, under colour of abhorring the ill principles of antiquated parties, they 
are authorized and feeding the same odious vices in different factions, and 
perhaps in worse. 
TILLMAN.DOC  DRAFT 1/18/2010  9:20:56 AM 
2009] BLUSHING OUR WAY PAST HISTORICAL FACT AND FICTION 403 
Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was 
literally put to the torch at Harvard because of “its uncomplimentary 
interpretation of early Christianity.”  In 1784, Ethan Allen, the leader 
of the Green Mountain Boys and the hero of the Battle of 
Ticonderoga,28 published a book-length argument for deism.  This 
work, Reason the Only Oracle of Man, was furiously condemned by 
the clergy.  Timothy Dwight accused Allen of championing “Satan’s 
cause,” Ezra Stiles charged that Allen was “profane and impious,” 
and the Reverend Nathan Perkins called him “one of the wickedest 
men that ever walked this guilty globe.”29 
 
 28. Compare Stone, supra note 3, at 21 (“Ethan Allen, the leader of the Green 
Mountain Boys and the hero of the Battle of Ticonderoga . . . .”), with 3 COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 210 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay, eds., 1905) (Senator 
Stephen A. Douglas:  “Whilst in Congress, [Lincoln] distinguished himself by his 
opposition to the Mexican War, taking the side of the common enemy against his own 
country . . . .”).  Undoubtedly, Judge Douglas and Professor Stone were factually correct.  
But is that the correct test here? 
 29. Stone, supra note 3, at 21 (bracketed language Tillman’s) (footnotes in the 
original omitted) (internal footnote added).  Stone’s selection of Perkins here seems 
problematic.  Although Perkins may have said the quoted material, Stone provides no 
reason to believe the quotation was intended or understood as a response to Allen’s tract 
on Deism.  Apparently, it was said during a 1789 graveside speech, i.e., given some five 
years after Allen’s 1784 publication of Reason the Only Oracle of Man.  See Kenneth S. 
Davis, In the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress!, AM. HERITAGE, 
October 1963, at 65, 77, available at http://tinyurl.com/bvr4l6 (“Consistent with the view 
of Ethan [Allen] as an ‘awful Infidel, one of ye wickedest men yt ever walked this guilty 
globe’ (so said one Reverend Nathan Perkins, who looked upon Allen’s grave with ‘pious 
horror’) . . . .”).  It is possible that Stone is correct, but it is also possible that Perkins’ 
comment had a more secular basis.  Perhaps connected to Allen’s “heroic” participation 
in the Yankee-Pennamite Wars, which nearly sparked a major interstate conflict arising 
from disputed Connecticut and Pennsylvania land grants in the Wyoming Valley?  See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the constitutional boundary of federal diversity 
jurisdiction to disputes between “Citizens of different States” or “Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 29 
(Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“The circumstances of the dispute between 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the lands at Wyoming, admonish us, not to be 
sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences.”); EDWIN P. HOYT, 
THE DAMNDEST YANKEES:  ETHAN ALLEN & HIS CLAN 228 (1976) (“[In 1785,] Ethan 
Allen did go down to Pennsylvania.  An independent state like Vermont was just what 
was needed there, he said.  He made plans to bring a bunch of the Green Mountain Boys 
down . . . .”).  Or, perhaps connected to Allen’s (alleged) part in negotiations to take 
Vermont back into the British Empire?  See id. at 221 (“Spring of 1783 brought an end to 
the war with Britain and an end to the uncertainty about Vermont’s position.  Although 
Ira and Ethan and some others still thought seriously of joining the British, the impetus 
was gone.”). 
In any event, is not a quotation from the Reverend Nathan Perkins a little too 
obscure?  How does Professor Stone know and how could the reader know if this man 
was representative of the clergy or “Christian establishment” of his day?  See 2 WILLIAM 
B. SPRAGUE, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN PULPIT 1-4 (New York, Robert Carter & 
Bros. 1857) (entry for Nathan Perkins, D.D.), available at http://tinyurl.com/d65zht.  
Perkins’ claim to fame—such as it is—was being Noah Webster’s grammar school 
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Stone’s consistent use of terms like “with a vengeance,” “warn[],” 
“biting,” “accused,” and “charged” is puzzling.  Is it really true the 
clergy not only “condemned” Allen’s Reason the Only Oracle of Man, 
but that they did so “furiously”?  How does one fairly distinguish a 
furious condemnation from a plain condemnation from a mere emphatic 
disagreement or an honest debate over strongly held beliefs and 
principles?  The choice of such terms is, in most (albeit, not in all) cases, 
indicative of a lack balance, of a lack of perspective.  Much of what 
Stone describes above was nothing more than writings and speeches in 
private letters, sermons, and books.  In law review articles, traditionally, 
such speech is usually characterized in less judgmental and more neutral 
terms, i.e., as core First Amendment protected activity (although there 
was, of course, no First Amendment at this time).30 
Indeed, if such speech is fairly characterized as “respond[ing] with a 
vengeance,” merely because it opposes other speech and comes next-in-
 
teacher.  See Noah Webster’s Story, http://noahwebsterhouse.org/anoahwebsterstory.html 
(last visited July 20, 2009).  Undoubtedly, men such as Ethan Allen and Nathan Perkins 
have and had their uses to their society and to their times.  I do not presume to judge 
them.  However, in making that statement, I do not wholly give up on the concept of 
judging the past and those who made it for us.  Rather, I would maintain that the same 
intellectual generosity which allows us to think moderately well of Allen ought also to 
allow us to think well of Perkins.  The test is really a simple one.  Had you and your 
children lived in their times, who would you have preferred to have had as a neighbor for 
yourself and for them?  The armed military adventurer or the educator who may have had 
parochial theological views?  Compare BURKE, supra note 21, at 47-48 (“People will not 
look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.”), with id. at 141 
(“No one generation could link with the other.  Men would become little better than the 
flies of a summer.”). 
 30. For a good example of the nonjudgmental milquetoast law review genre, see 
Professor Stone’s description of Melville B. Nimmer’s performance in Cohen v. 
California. 
In 180 years of Supreme Court history, no one had ever uttered the word “fuck” 
in the Supreme Court chamber, and Burger was determined that it would not 
happen on his watch.  Thus, as Nimmer approached the podium to begin his 
argument, the white-haired Burger leaned over the bench and said, “Mr. 
Nimmer, . . . the Court is thoroughly familiar with the factual setting of this 
case, and it will not be necessary for you . . . to dwell on the facts.”  To which 
Nimmer, understanding full well the importance of saying the word, replied, 
“At Mr. Chief Justice’s suggestion . . . I certainly will keep very brief the 
statement of facts . . . .  What this young man did was to walk through a 
courthouse corridor . . . wearing a jacket upon which were inscribed the words 
‘Fuck the Draft.’”  And lo and behold, the walls of the courthouse did not 
crumble.  At that moment, I believe, Mel Nimmer won his case. 
Stone, supra note 3, at 2 (footnotes omitted).  As a factual matter, Stone is almost 
certainly wrong.  The exclamation was said many times—even by the Justices 
themselves—just not in open court, just not on the record.  Cf. 5 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY 
POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 834 (2003) (“Indifference and neglect often do 
much more damage than outright dislike . . . .”).  If you, the reader, believe I am merely 
telling a joke here at Professor Stone’s expense (or at my own), you are seriously 
mistaken, and I would invite you to read the remainder of this Article.  Cf. supra note 25. 
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time, then this Article and every other academic disagreement will fall 
under the orbit of that expression.  At that point the phrase itself ceases 
to be meaningful.  Admittedly, not all of the statements quoted by Stone 
were vanilla, even-handed, and unthreatening:  Stiles’ “conquer and 
demolish” statement does seem a touch strong.31  But Stiles looks much 
better in fuller context. 
It is true with this Liberty [of accepting deistical books into 
religiously-affiliated university libraries] Error may be introduced; 
but turn the Tables [and see that] the propagation of Truth may be 
extinguished [if you do otherwise].  Deism has got such Head in this 
Age of Licentious Liberty, that it would be in vain to try to stop it by 
hiding the Deistical Writings:  and the only Way left to conquer & 
demolish it, is to come forth into the open Field & Dispute this matter 
on even Footing—the Evidences of Revelation in my opinion are 
nearly as demonstrative as Newton’s Principia, & these are the 
Weapons to be used . . . .  Truth & this alone being our Aim in fact, 
open, frank & generous we shall avoid the very appearance of Evil.32 
 
 31. Even if Stone’s snippets from the writings of Stiles, Dwight, and Perkins had 
been fairly representative of their individual writings, Stone’s conclusion would still not 
necessarily follow.  Compare BURKE, supra note 21, at 213 (emphasis added): 
I can allow in clergymen, through all their divisions, some tenaciousness of 
their own opinion; some overflowings [sic] of zeal for its propagation; some 
predilection to their own state and office; some attachment to the interest of 
their own corps; some preference to those who listen with docility to their 
doctrines, beyond those who scorn and deride them.  I allow all this, because I 
am a man who have [sic] to deal with men, and who would not, through a 
violence of toleration, run into the greatest of all intolerance.  I must bear with 
infirmities until they fester into crimes. 
with Ethan Allen History, http://www.uvm.edu/~vhnet/hertour/eallen/eahistory.html 
(noting that Allen’s Reason the Only Oracle of Man provided “Ethan [Allen] [with an 
opportunity] to lambaste New England’s clergy for what he saw as their failure to 
recognize the dignity of ordinary people.”) (emphasis added) (last visited July 20, 2009). 
 32. Letter from Ezra Stiles to Rector Thomas Clap (Aug. 6, 1759), in I. 
WOODBRIDGE RILEY, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY:  THE EARLY SCHOOLS 216, 217 (New York, 
Dodd, Mead & Co. 1907) (cited by Stone, supra note 3, at 21 n.155), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/bt73ze; G. ADOLF KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION:  THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION AND THE CULT OF REASON 239 (Peter Smith reprint 1964) (New York, 
Henry Holt & Co. 1933).  Of course, Stiles had other moods, as do we all.  See  Davis, 
supra note 29, at 77: 
When news of the [death of Ethan Allen] reached New Haven, the Reverend 
Doctor Ezra Stiles, president of Yale, known as an “inveterate chronicler” of 
things which might interest posterity, noted in his diary:  “General Ethan Allen 
of Vermont died and went to Hell this day.” 
Ezra Stiles might have been a bit of a pill to have around; he may have been difficult to 
sit next to at high table, particularly if the port were freely flowing.  But to describe Stiles 
or men like him as vaguely threatening is an act of the historical imagination that would 
even make practitioners of magic realism green with envy.  Cf. 2 J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE 
LORD OF THE RINGS/THE TWO TOWERS 29 (1965) (“For not we but those who come after 
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How is this an example of the “establishment respond[ing] with a 
vengeance” to the spread of Deism?  If anything Stiles overflows with a 
very boring, almost trite excess of Brandeisian toleration,33 although he 
clearly is attached to his own parochial theological views.  To me at 
least, Stone’s “conquer and demolish” snippet misses much more than it 
explains. 
As to Stone’s fantastic claim34 that circa 1789 Gibbon’s Decline and 
Fall was “literally put to the torch at Harvard,”35 I see no evidence that 
any such event ever happened.  To make his case, Stone wholly relies on 
Professor Kerry Walters’ 1992 publication:  Rational Infidels:  The 
 
will make the legends of our time.  [‘]The green earth,[’] you say?  That is a mighty matter 
of legend, though you tread it under the light of day!”). 
 33. Cf. DAVID CORNWELL (nom de plume John le Carré), THE SECRET PILGRIM 28 
(1991) (“‘That’s the trouble in our job, Ned,’ [the spy master] explained contentedly . . . .  
‘Life’s looking one way, we’re looking the other.  I like an honest-to-God enemy myself 
sometimes, I don’t mind admitting.  Take[s] a lot of finding, though, don’t they?  Too 
many nice blokes about.’”). 
 34. The reader may believe that my use of “fantastic claim” in this manner is 
inappropriate, if not indistinguishable from the (arguably) exaggerated intellectual claims 
that I criticize in others.  To be sure, I do not use “fantastic claim” (as opposed to “a 
knowingly or recklessly false claim”) as a term of opprobrium.  I use it purely 
descriptively. 
Indeed, the fantastic claim plays a necessary role in the development of law and 
other disciplines.  The fantastic claim is the placeholder for interesting, but not yet fully 
formed or supported ideas, put forward by authors in the hope of full development (by 
themselves and others) should the line of research prove fruitful.  The fantastic claim is 
also the placeholder for deeply idiosyncratic or wildly unpopular ideas whose 
justification will only be had (if at all) after a change of heart or mind within a discipline 
or by wider society.  In short, I have made fantastic claims in my own publications (or, at 
least, so I have been told), and I do not regret having done so.  See, e.g., Steven G. 
Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 141 (2008) (critiquing Tillman’s position as “utterly 
implausible”) (emphasis added), responding to Seth Barrett Tillman, Opening Statement, 
Why President-Elect Obama May Keep His Senate Seat After Assuming the 
Presidency, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 135-40 (2008) (arguing that the 
Incompatibility Clause does not apply to the office of President), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf.  And, happily, sometimes 
the change of mind comes surprisingly quickly.  Compare Calabresi, supra, at 145 (2008) 
(affirming that the president “take[s] office in a public ceremony with elements of a 
coronation, and there is a magic moment when the powers of office becomes invested in 
them which is when they take the oath of office”), with Posting of Steven G. Calabresi to 
Balkinization, supra note 16 (2009) (“The oath is thus not our Constitution’s analog to 
the crowning of a King.  The Oath Clause simply mandates that the President must take 
the oath before entering on the execution of his office.”) (emphasis added), and Bruce 
Peabody, Imperfect Oaths, the Primed President, and an Abundance of Constitutional 
Caution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 12, 27 (2009) (arguing that “until the [Article II] 
oath is recited” by the President, he is “den[ied] . . . the full powers of [his] office” 
thereby “potentially ‘blocking’ the exercise of the federal executive power [prior to the 
President’s taking the oath]”). 
 35. Stone, supra note 3, at 21. 
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American Deists.36  Walters does not actually say “torched,” he says 
“burned.”37  Walters, in turn, relies on William Henry Channing’s The 
Life of William Ellery Channing, D.D. and G. Adolf Koch’s Republican 
Religion.38  But neither work supports Walters’ position.  Channing 
merely records that “[t]he patrons and governors of the college made 
efforts to counteract the effect of the[] [principles of the French 
Revolution] by exhortation, and preaching, and prayer, as well as by the 
publication of and distribution of good books and pamphlets.”39  I see no 
indication of any book-burning.  By contrast, Koch writes that in 1791 
“Gibbon’s famous work was publicly banned . . . by the President of 
Harvard College from that institution.”40  Again, no book-burning, no 
torching, no auto-da-fé. 
Nevertheless book-banning at a university is pretty terrible behavior 
(or, at least, it is when adjudged under contemporary standards).  But it 
seems there was no book banning either!  Koch’s only source is John 
Quincy Adams’ Life in a New England Town:  1787, 1788.41  Adams 
does not indicate that Gibbon was banned; rather, Adams indicates that 
in setting the curriculum the President preferred Millot’s Elements of 
 
 36. See id. at 21 & n.156 (citing KERRY WALTERS, RATIONAL INFIDELS:  THE 
AMERICAN DEISTS 8-9 (1992)). 
 37. KERRY WALTERS, RATIONAL INFIDELS:  THE AMERICAN DEISTS 9 (1992).  Like 
Kramnick & Moore’s The Godless Constitution, discussed supra notes 24 and 26, 
Walters’ book is not fully cited.  As a result, many of his factual claims cannot be 
checked (or, at least, it is unclear what sources one should consult in order to check his 
claims).  For example, he states that “Harvard officials” made Watson’s Apology for the 
Bible “required reading.”  Id.  However, Channing’s The Life of William Ellery 
Channing, D.D. (Walters’ apparent source) only indicates that the Apology was 
distributed to students.  See infra note 39 (1899 ed.), at 31; id. (1880 ed.), at 31.  To be 
clear, nothing here is meant as a criticism directed to Professor Walters and the citation 
practices prevailing in books intended for a generalist audience.  (It is certainly possible 
that Professor Walters relied on other sources, but chose not to cite them.)  The question 
for us is whether such sources as Rational Infidels or The Godless Constitution—standing 
alone or even together—fairly support contentious historical claims made in law review 
articles.  I submit that they do not.  Cf. supra note 24 (criticizing Professor Stone’s 
reliance on Kramnick & Moore’s The Godless Constitution because it is not fully 
sourced). 
 38. See WALTERS, supra note 37, at 9 & 9 nn.8, 9 (citing G. ADOLF KOCH, 
REPUBLICAN RELIGION:  THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE CULT OF REASON 242 
(1933), and W.H. CHANNING, LIFE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D. 30 (Boston, Am. 
Unitarian Ass’n 1880)). 
 39. WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D. 31 
(Boston, University Press 6th ed. 1899) (centennial ed. 1880) (1848), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/c8fc9x; WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING, LIFE OF WILLIAM ELLERY 
CHANNING, D.D. 31 (Boston, Am. Unitarian Ass’n 1880). 
 40. KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION, supra note 32, at 290 n.6; see also G. ADOLF 
KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION:  THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE CULT OF 
REASON 290 n.6 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1933) (same). 
 41. See id. (citing JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN:  1787, 
1788/DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 113 n.1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1903)). 
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History42 to Gibbon’s Decline and Fall.43  To sum up, in 1791 Harvard 
made a mundane curriculum decision; it was recorded in a 1903 
publication; in 1933 it became a book-banning; in 1992 it became a 
book-burning, and in 2008 Professor Stone tells us Gibbon was “literally 
put to the torch”44 at Harvard.  Literally. 
The constellation of facts, misunderstandings, misstatements, 
exaggeration, and error hardly seems believable.45  Still, there is no 
reason to judge Stone harshly:  such mistakes do happen.46  His mistake, 
such as it was, was to rely on a single source, Walters, who, apparently 
misquoted Koch, who expanded on Adams’ initial statement. 
 
*** 
 
 42. ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS XAVIER MILLOT, ELEMENTS OF GENERAL HISTORY 
(Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1789); ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS XAVIER MILLOT, ELEMENTS 
OF GENERAL HISTORY (Salem, Thomas C. Cushing 1796); ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS 
XAVIER MILLOT, ELEMENTS OF ANCIENT HISTORY (New York, Mott & Lyon 1797). 
 43. See JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN:  1787, 1788/DIARY OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 113 n.1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1903), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/alj5yx; see also The Harvard Guide:  History, Lore, and More, 
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/guide/lore/lore9.html (entry for 1791) (last visited July 20, 
2009). 
 44. Stone, supra note 3, at 21. 
 45. There is little doubt in my mind that each and every misstep was made in good 
faith.  Still, one can only shed a tear in contemplation of what current and future law 
students, law school academics, academics in allied fields, and jurists will publish in 
reliance on Stone, Walters, and Koch.  See, e.g., Leon Jackson, The Rights of Man and 
the Rites of Youth:  Fraternity and Riot at Eighteenth-Century Harvard, in THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 46, 54 & n.32 (Roger Geiger 
ed., 2000) (asserting that Gibbon’s Decline and Fall was banned) (citing HERBERT M. 
MORAIS, DEISM IN [] EIGHTEENTH CENTURY [AMERICA] 161 n.5 (New York, Russell & 
Russell 1960) (New York, Columbia Univ. Press 1934) (asserting that Gibbon’s Decline 
and Fall was banned, but failing to cite any authority)), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/bnmt69 (citing MORAIS, DEISM (1960 ed.), http://tinyurl.com/b8kv4q 
(1934 ed.)).  Both Koch, supra note 32, and Morais, supra, had New York publishers and 
published within a year of one another, during the Great Depression.  Indeed, Morais 
cites Koch several times.  See, e.g., MORAIS, DEISM, supra, at 14 n.1 (1934) (citing KOCH, 
REPUBLICAN RELIGION, supra note 40, at 144 (1933)); id. at 130 n.28 (citing KOCH, 
REPUBLICAN RELIGION, supra note 40, at 290-01 (1933)).  See generally MORAIS, DEISM 
(1934), http://tinyurl.com/d26r5f (searching text using “Koch”).  It is interesting to 
speculate that Morais relied on Koch in regard to his assertion that Gibbon’s Decline and 
Fall was banned, as later authors did, directly and indirectly.  See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, 
The Law Book in Colonial America, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1120 n.3 (2003) (citing Leon 
Jackson’s The Rights of Man and the Rites of Youth in regard to the purported banning of 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall). 
 46. Stone is by no means alone.  I have seen very similar mistakes in relation to any 
number of constitutional provisions and associated historical claims.  For example, the 
history of the Succession Clause, the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, the Journals 
Clause, the Quorum Clause, and the Opinions Clause were profoundly miswritten by 
earlier academics and jurists.  Current academics seem wholly unable to escape the 
clutches of these prior errors.  Someday I hope to return to these issues. 
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. . . Here we come to an awkward and difficult point.  Leave aside 
Professors Stone, and Walters, and Koch—what about you, the 
reasonable and well-informed reader.  When you read Stone’s claim in 
regard to a book burning at Harvard, circa 1789, did you believe it?  Try 
to remember your reaction, if any.  Did it seem shockingly wrong, or did 
you just read past his claim as a matter of no real consequence, or did it 
seem reasonably tenable to you?  And if you thought the latter, what 
other historical fictions (or unsupported factual claims) might you 
believe in error (or absent sufficient evidence), and what does that say 
about the prejudices you may harbor in relation to people different from 
yourself? 
Did you blush when you read Stone’s claim, or are you blushing 
now? 
 
*** 
III. A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR STONE’S SELECTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
EARLY AMERICAN MATERIALS 
Professor Stone’s use of historical materials, both during the era of 
the founding and post-ratification, seems oddly selective.47  His essay 
focuses on Franklin, Jefferson,48 John Adams, Washington, and 
 
 47. Stone cites any number of deists as having “had a profound influence on the 
founding generation.”  Stone, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that “deism” was “[t]he most 
important religious trend of the mid-eighteenth century”); see, e.g., id. (“John Toland, for 
example, argued that in order to be credible, a religion must be logical and it must be 
consistent with the laws of nature . . . .  And Matthew Tindal . . . .”); id. at 6 n.38 (citing 
Anthony Collins).  But he gives the reader no reason to believe that these particular 
authors were widely read by or influenced the world-view of the Founders, Ratifiers, or 
the American public.  Cf., e.g., BURKE, supra note 21, at 133: 
Who, born within the last forty years [between 1750 and 1790], has read one 
word of Collins, and Toland, and Tindal, and Chubb, and Morgan, and that 
whole race who called themselves Freethinkers?  Who now reads Bolingbroke?  
Who ever read him through?  Ask the booksellers of London what is become of 
all these lights of the world. 
Indeed, even if one conceded that these philosophers influenced the American mind, it is 
not clear that they were, in fact, deists as Professor Stone argues.  See W.R. Sorley, 
Anthony Collins’s Discourse of Free-thinking, in 9 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
AND AMERICAN LITERATURE pt XI, § 12, at 326-27 (A.W. Ward & A.R. Waller 
eds., 1913) (“[T]here is no evidence that [Toland] ever accepted the cardinal point of 
what is commonly called deism—the idea of God as an external creator who made the 
world, set it under certain laws, and then left it alone.   He was a free-thinker rather than a 
deist.   And this, also, describes the position occupied by Anthony Collins . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.bartleby.com/219/1112.html. 
 48. Stone’s reliance on Jefferson’s post-ratification views seems, as a 
methodological matter, misplaced.  See Stone, supra note 3, at 25 (“By the end of his life 
in 1826, Thomas Jefferson could look back with a sense of despair, because, in his view, 
TILLMAN.DOC  DRAFT 1/18/2010  9:20:56 AM 
410 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114:2 
Paine49—all of whom were active in the Revolution.  Indeed, the first 
 
American society was going backward.”).  By 1826, Jefferson may have changed his 
views in regard to any number of issues that were of relevance in 1776 and in 1787. 
Moreover, Jefferson continued to own slaves from 1776 through 1826.  Perhaps his 
judgment in regard to what was “backwards” is something that we ought not to rely on?  
Perhaps his “despair” would have been more in tune with the spirit of ‘76, then-current 
political reality, and the consequential future risks his country faced had it been 
connected to (and actively directed against) the overwhelming power of the slavocracy 
and slavery—if only that small amount under his direct personal control?  Would that 
have been a better use of his time (and Professor Stone’s and our own) than mooning 
over the religious sensibilities of his (and our) neighbors?  Cf. AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 347 (“America’s third president . . . had passionately 
condemned slavery in his early years but did rather little to back up his youthful rhetoric 
after his slavery-supported triumph in 1801.”).  
Indeed, just prior to this Article going to press, in a public lecture, Professor Stone 
opined: 
[The separation of church and state] is the fundamental issue posed 
by the Second Great Awakening.  And it remains a fundamental issue 
today.  As citizens, advocates of Sunday closing laws, temperance 
legislation, the abolition of slavery, anti-abortion laws, prohibitions 
of stem cell research and laws for begetting same sex marriage are 
free to support such policies because they honestly believe they serve 
constitutionally legitimate ends.  And they are, of course, also 
completely free to urge others to embrace and to abide by their own 
religious beliefs.  But what they are not free to do, what they must 
strive not to do if they want to be good citizens is to use the law to 
impose their own specific religious beliefs upon others. 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Georgia State University Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture: The 
Second Great Awakening, http://tinyurl.com/y8u9un7, at 0:52:21.2 (Oct. 15, 2009) 
(emphasis added); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Perils of Religious Passion: A 
Response to Professor Samuel Calhoun, 57 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 15 (2009), 
http://uclalawreview.org/?p=500.  Is it really so obvious that a citizen circa 1860 who had 
supported public policies seeking to limit or to overthrow slavery on sectarian religious 
grounds failed to live up to the aspirational goals of our constitutional order?  Is it a 
matter of concern that slave owners were, to use Professor Stone's terms, “imposed” 
upon?  One wonders why Professor Stone sees the legal order so clearly through the eyes 
of Jefferson and other slave owners, rather than the slave who might have had his 
shackles loosened?  Is it not possible that in our world of second bests, First Amendment 
church-state absolutism ought, in some circumstances, to give way to other values and 
that in making that difficult weighing of competing values responsible persons should be 
loathe to declare our fellows bad citizens merely because they weigh things differently 
than we do?  
 49. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church And State Should Be Separate, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2193, 2204-05 (2008) (footnote omitted): 
But I must admit, in all honesty, that I believe one could find just as much 
evidence and just as many quotations from the Framers for each of the 
[competing theories of the First Amendment].  This is why I believe that we 
cannot resolve modern constitutional issues by looking back at history; history 
is far too equivocal for that.  The Framers were not of one mind with regard to 
religion.  Indeed, the Framers varied greatly among themselves in the degree of 
their own religious observance. 
Although there is much here with which I agree, I believe Professor Chemerinsky errs in 
part.  To the extent that we are interested in the intent of the Framers, their “degree of 
[personal] religious observance” is the wrong specific intellectual tradition to examine in 
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three signed the Declaration of Independence.  But between the 1776 
Declaration and the Constitution of 1787 was a war, a flurry of state 
constitution drafting, an intermediate national constitution, Shays’ 
Rebellion, and more than a decade.  To conflate the world view of (some 
of) those who participated in 1776 with the world view of a different 
(albeit overlapping) set of men at a different time who guided events 
in 1787 requires substantial justification.50  Stone just elides over the 
distinction.51  Indeed, at the time of the framing and during ratification, 
Jefferson and Adams were absent on diplomatic missions.  Paine was 
abroad.  Washington and Franklin attended the Philadelphia Convention, 
but Washington acted as the presiding officer and played little active role 
in debate.  Franklin, like Washington, was also mostly cast in the role of 
elder statesman. 
Still let us assume, as Professor Stone argues, that each of these five 
influential men personally subscribed to Deism.  Should that inform our 
understanding of the Constitution, even in regard to the intellectual 
milieu at the time of the Founding?  Is not that view strangely under 
 
regard to understanding Framers’ intent.  What we should be interested in is their views 
in regard to how a human being and citizen should translate (if at all) personal 
observance into generalized legal obligations and exemptions.  See generally Bret Boyce, 
Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493 (2008).  It would be 
an empirical error of the first order to believe that merely because a set of persons’ views 
are in accord as to personal observance, their views in regard to framing the legal order 
are similarly congruent.  And absent such congruence, we have no reason to be interested 
in their degree of personal religious observance.  But see Posting of Alfred Brophy to The 
Faculty Lounge, Stone on the Nature of the Founders’ Christianity, 
http://tinyurl.com/apwvw2 (Oct. 22, 2008, 8:46 AM): 
[Professor Stone] makes the important—and I would have thought obvious, 
except that it hasn’t been much discussed of late—point that our country’s 
founders were often liberal Protestants.  They took a very broad approach to 
their belief in God—many were deists.  They were children of the 
Enlightenment.  As I say, I don’t think that’s news to people who work in early 
American religion; but disciplinary barriers are mighty high and so I suspect 
this is an important insight for us in the law businesses.  And Stone’s synthesis 
of the learning of the last generation of historical scholarship helps lawyers 
understand the religious context of our Constitution. 
 50. See generally Richard D. Brown, The Founding Fathers of 1776 and 1787:  A 
Collective View, 33 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 465 (1976).  There is now substantial 
academic and judicial discussion of the role (if any) for the Declaration of Independence 
in constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 255 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE); Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution 
Incorporate the Declaration of Independence?, 1 NEV. L.J. 138 (2001). 
 51. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 21-22 (“Did the Framers intend the United 
States to be a Christian nation?  Clearly they did not.  The Declaration of Independence 
marked a fundamental shift in our history.”).  I do not disagree with either of these 
statements.  But I see no reason to believe that the latter supports the former.  
Unfortunately, Professor Stone is not alone in making this type of error.  See supra note 2 
(quoting a Justice Rehnquist dissent). 
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theorized?52  It has happened from time to time that religious men have 
worked towards pluralistic (and, even, secular) political orders.  It has 
also happened from time to time that irreligious men have served 
inquisitors (of religious and secular varieties).  The fact that the five 
Americans discussed by Stone may have been Deists, only, at best, opens 
as a possibility for our enquiry what they intended to build, what they 
hoped to achieve.  So although it is a possibility that their religious or 
philosophical sensibilities influenced their political views, as to how the 
Constitution should be drafted, as to how the new Republic should be 
ordered, it is not self-evident that it did influence them.  It is not even 
presumptively true.  To put it another way, if Deism (or, Christianity, for 
that matter) did not actually inform them in regard to building the 
American political order, it is difficult to see how knowledge of such 
abstract philosophical (or religious) views should inform us in 
understanding the political order they built.  I suppose that is a 
contestable view.  Still, I have not seen anyone actually contest it, 
including Professor Stone, which to some extent proves my point, if only 
elliptically. 
And post-ratification materials?  What have our federal courts said 
about the issue under discussion?  Customarily, law professors discuss 
such materials.53  But not Professor Stone; he fails to acknowledge that 
they even exist.  For example, in 1892, Justice Brewer—writing for an 
unanimous Supreme Court—wrote that “this is a Christian nation.”54  I 
 
 52. See supra note 49 (explaining that commitments relating to personal beliefs and 
observance do not necessarily translate into commitments in regard to public law and 
constitution drafting). 
 53. For a representative example of the usual protocol see GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE 
WAR ON TERRORISM 529 (2004): 
Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas corpus were declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan . . . .  These after-the-fact [Supreme Court] 
judgments [in regard to the wartime suspension of civil liberties] should not be 
controversial.  They are sound conclusions based on comprehensive 
information about the actions and motives of the government in each of these 
[wartime] episodes. 
 54. Compare Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) 
(Brewer, J.) (asserting that “this is a Christian nation”), and Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 
U.S. 127, 198 (1844) (Story, J.) (denominating the United States, or perhaps 
Pennsylvania, as a “Christian country”), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 
(1952) (Douglas, J.) (“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being.”), and Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that “the federal government’s symbology 
has been Christian—down to the dating of the Constitution”), with Stone, supra note 3, 
at 3 (noting that “modern-day Christian evangelicals assert that the United States was 
founded as a ‘Christian nation’”).  Why single out nonacademic modern-day evangelicals 
for making this intellectual claim?  It may be wrong, but they are hardly alone.  Judge 
Easterbrook, for example, is one of Professor Stone’s colleagues at the University of 
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happen to think Brewer and the Court wrong.55  My guess, and it is just a 
guess, is that Melville B. Nimmer would have thought it wrong too.  But 
I suspect that he may also have told us why. 
 
 
Chicago.  Cf. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 26, at 23.  Even Professor Stone does not 
refrain from using such language when it serves a useful purpose.  See, e.g., Stone, The 
Perils of Religious Passion, supra note 48, at 23-24 (“But just as we would expect a 
predominantly Muslim community to strive to know the difference between their 
religious beliefs about alcohol and public policy concerns about alcohol, so too should we 
expect such respect for the law from our predominantly Christian nation.”).  
 55. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[N]o amount of 
repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true.”).  See 
generally Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois Pub. Law Research Paper 
No. 07-24) (Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, posted on the Social Science 
Research Network (a/k/a SSRN)), available at http://tinyurl.com/ndp845 (last visited 
July 20, 2009). 
